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Abstract
Understanding the complex dynamic and uncertain
characteristics of organisational employees who per-
form authorised or unauthorised information security
activities is deemed to be a very important and chal-
lenging task. This paper presents a conceptual frame-
work for classifying and organising the characteristics
of organisational subjects involved in these informa-
tion security practices. Our framework expands the
traditional Human Behaviour and the Social Environ-
ment perspectives used in social work by identifying
how knowledge, skills and individual preferences work
to influence individual and group practices with re-
spect to information security management. The clas-
sification of concepts and characteristics in the frame-
work arises from a review of recent literature and is
underpinned by theoretical models that explain these
concepts and characteristics. Further, based upon
an exploratory study of three case organisations in
Saudi Arabia involving extensive interviews with se-
nior managers, department managers, IT managers,
information security officers, and IT staff; this arti-
cle describes observed information security practices
and identifies several factors which appear to be par-
ticularly important in influencing information secu-
rity behaviour. These factors include values asso-
ciated with national and organisational culture and
how they manifest in practice, and activities related
to information security management.
Keywords: information security management, con-
ceptual framework, information security culture, in-
formation security behaviour and compliance.
1 Introduction
Studies have shown that non-technical issues are at
least as important as technical issues in safeguard-
ing an organisation’s sensitive information (Dhillon
and Torkzadeh, 2006; Siponen and Oinas-Kukkonen,
2007). The importance of non-technical issues re-
lated to security management, however, has been de-
emphasised in many studies by virtue of their quan-
titative nature (Siponen and Oinas-Kukkonen, 2007).
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As a result, little attention has been paid to the role of
human factors (e.g. individual choice and behaviour)
or to organisational factors such as national and or-
ganisational culture, environment, and levels of in-
formation security awareness, and how these factors
relate to attitudes about information security and its
management. However, studies have shown that these
factors are crucial to successfully of safeguarding or-
ganisational information assets and that user input
is imperative in addressing information security man-
agement strategies or issues (Vroom and von Solms,
2004).
There is general consensus that the purpose of infor-
mation systems security is to ensure business conti-
nuity and minimise damage by preventing and /or
minimising the business impact of security incidents.
Dhillon et al. (2007) argue that “computer crime com-
mitted by internal employees is essentially a rational
act” that may result from internal or external factors
(e.g personal factors, work situation and available op-
portunities). These authors assert that behavioural
security holds the key to successful information sys-
tem security management (Dhillon et al., 2007).
Information security compromised by organisational
insiders (employees and other stakeholders who have
physical and/or logical access to organisational as-
sets) can pose an enormous threat to an organisation’s
information systems. The risk posed to data by in-
siders needs to be closely monitored and managed.
This risk can takes two forms. The first form of risk
is that posed by malicious insiders who deliberately
leak sensitive data for personal financial gain or other
criminal purposes. The second form of risk is from in-
siders who unintentionally exposure data. Both these
forms can result from carelessness or attempts to work
around security measures. Information security man-
agement theorists assert that the behaviour of users
needs to be directed and monitored to ensure com-
pliance with security requirements (Vroom and von
Solms, 2004; Dhillon et al., 2007; von Solms and von
Solms, 2004). This view suggests that the success of
an information security program depends on users’
behaviour related to information security. Therefore,
we contend that a better understanding of the char-
acteristics of users’ information security behaviours,
will assist in assessing, improving and auditing indi-
vidual information security behaviours, particularly
in dynamic security environments.
Fishbein and Ajzen (1975) present the theory of rea-
soned action (TRA). TRA seeks to explain that an
individual’s behaviour or action is determined by his
or her intention to perform such behaviour. Thus,
TRA considers that behaviour is determined by in-
tention - which is in turn influenced by the individ-
ual’s attitude towards performing that behaviour, and
subjective norms (social pressures to perform the be-
haviour). The theory of reasoned action and its exten-
sion the Theory of Planned Behaviour (TPB) (Ajzen,
1985) have been applied in several studies relating
to information security issues. More specifically, in
risk perception, and security-related behaviour, both
theories suggest that “ease of use” is an important
factor affecting human behaviours. Siponen (2000)
finds that the issues associated with “ease of use” of
security solutions (e.g. techniques and adherence to
procedures) has not been well addressed in the se-
curity literature. He suggests that a qualitative re-
search approach would be appropriate to investigate
this topic.
Earlier research has suggested several factors are cru-
cial to information security policy adherence and user
awareness. For example, Straub et al. (1993) applied
the deterrence argument that information security ac-
tions will deter users from committing unauthorised
acts. The deterrence argument has also been applied
to improving the quality of information security poli-
cies (von Solms and von Solms, 2004), promoting se-
curity awareness (Straub and Nance, 1990), develop-
ing structures of responsibility (Dhillon et al., 2007)
and protecting assets by motivation (Workman et al.,
2008). Each of these studies provides important in-
sights into specific issues relating to users adherence
with security policies. To some extent, these stud-
ies all draw on the theory of reasoned action (TRA)
and the theory of planned behaviour (TPB) (Fishbein
and Ajzen, 1975; Ajzen, 1985), to understand and test
constructs related to individuals’ information security
behaviours.
However, most of these studies, have paid little at-
tention to the influence of national and /or organi-
sational culture on employees attitudes, beliefs, and
behaviours, or to the interactions between the indi-
viduals and their context. These interactions, may
also contribute to an individual’s beliefs and values
about information security and its management.
2 The Analytic Framework
While there are some normative models for informa-
tion security behaviour which are reported to work for
one or two firms, there is little in the way of general
guidance. The research reported here thus represents
a preliminary attempt to identify a descriptive mea-
sure of information security related behaviours that
are applicable for different types of organisations.
Classification theory suggests that classifying per-
ceptions is crucial to human survival and adapta-
tion, and attempts to explain the nature of concepts
(categories/ classes) and why humans classify things
(Smith and Medin, 1981; Parsons, 1996). Stanton
et al. (2005) suggest that it is important to have a
systematic view of end users security behaviour to fa-
cilitate accurate auditing and assessment of this be-
haviour. Therefore a classification that emphasises
the characteristics of the organisational subjects who
may perform authorised or unauthorised actions is
proposed as helpful to understanding individual in-
formation security behaviour. Such a classification
may serve two purposes for an organisation. Firstly,
categorising a phenomenon makes systematic studies
possible, and secondly, classification may assist organ-
isations prioritise their information security efforts.
The term “knowing-doing gap” refers to people who
have knowledge but do not take action or behaviour
consistent with that knowledge (Pfeffer and Sutton,
2000). Workman et al. (2008) used this concept
to investigate people’s security behaviour referring
to “people who have been trained but then do not
use their new knowledge or skills as management ex-
pects”. Following this analogy, we propose other pos-
sible patterns of an individual’s behaviour with re-
spect to information security practices. We choose
to call these patterns modes (where mode means a
“manner or way of acting, doing, or being; method or
form”) (Webster’s New World Dictionary).
Based on an individual’s acknowledgment of the se-
curity rules and possession of the essential skills for
performing certain actions, we identify four modes to
categorise individual security behaviours: Knowing-
Doing mode, Knowing-Not doing mode, Not knowing-
Doing mode and Not knowing-Not doing mode. Table
1 summarises the four modes. Figure 1 depicts these
modes and their inter-relationships. The arrow lines
connecting each mode represent the dynamic move-
ment of each mode, which draws influences from indi-
vidual’s skills, knowledge and values based on change
across the internal and external environment. Each
mode is defined, theoretically justified and supported
with relevant example/s as follows.
Values
Knowledge
Skills
Outcomes
Practices
Mode(1)Mode(2)
Mode(3) Mode(4)
Figure 1: Information Security Behaviour Modes
Mode(1): Not Knowing-Not Doing In this
mode, which falls into the upper right corner of the
model of information security behaviour modes, the
subject does Not Know the organisation’s require-
ments for information security of behaviour and does
not have security knowledge. As a result, they are Not
Doing the right behaviour (violation of the security
rules for behaviour - and security is compromised).
An example is a user who is not aware of the existence
of organisational information security policies; he/she
cannot be expected to follow them. Regardless of the
presence of the necessary resources and the motiva-
tion to succeed, he/she can still fail to comply be-
cause they lack the knowledge of requirements/rules.
An employee who has just joined the organisation or
a manger who just been promoted to a new position
may belong to this mode. This mode is a type of cog-
nitive failure. Cognitive failures include issues such
as: misunderstanding the security policy, missing an
update of the policy, and poor decision-making.
Mode(2): Not Knowing-Doing: This second
mode falls into the upper left corner of the model.
The subject does Not Know the information security
requirements/rules of behaviour and does not have se-
curity knowledge but is nevertheless Doing the right
security behaviour (following the rules - security is
not compromised).
Table 1: Information Security Behaviour Modes
Modes of individuals’ behaviour Description Example of related information se-
curity behaviour
Mode(1): Not Knowing-Not Doing In this mode the subject does Not Know
the organisation’s requirements for infor-
mation security of behaviour and does
not have security knowledge. As a re-
sult, they are Not Doing the right be-
haviour (violation of the security rules
for behaviour - and security is compro-
mised).
-Information security policy is not in
place or is not properly communicated to
the user:
-sharing passwords
-downloading internet software
-visiting harm web contents.
Mode(2): Not Knowing-Doing The subject does Not Know the in-
formation security requirements/rules of
behaviour and does not have security
knowledge but is nevertheless Doing the
right security behaviour (following the
rules - security is not compromised).
-Although there is no means provided to
the users but they are voluntarily:
-reporting valuations.
-sharing related information and knowl-
edge
Mode(3): Knowing-Not Doing The the subject Knows the rules of be-
haviour and has the required knowledge
and skills, but is Not Doing the right
behaviour (violation of the rules of be-
haviour - security is compromised).
-Even though there was a policy at place
and well communicated, users intention-
ally violating the related rules.
-users using shortcuts to accomplish risky
task.
-users ignoring related procedures and
rules.
Mode(4): Knowing-Doing In this mode the subject Knows the
rules of behaviour and has the knowl-
edge/skills and they are Doing the right
behaviour (following the rules - security
is not compromised).
-Information security at place and well
communicated and users are abiding by
the rules.
A subject who is not aware of organisation infor-
mation security policies, but asks supervisors or co-
workers before taking certain actions, is an exam-
ple of this mode. Some people may exercise more
caution than others when they are uncertain how to
act. This prudent behaviour demonstrates the con-
ventional economic concept of being risk averse. The
concept of risk being averse suggests that, when fac-
ing choices with the same outcomes, subjects tend
to choose the less-risky one (Friedman and Savage,
1948). To some extent, this mode is also traceable
to the self-regulatory model, which identifies rule-
following as ”originating within an individual’s intrin-
sic desire to follow organisational rules” (Tyler et al.,
2007).
Mode(3): Knowing-Not Doing: In this third
mode, which takes the lower left corner of the model,
the subject Knows the rules of behaviour and has the
required knowledge and skills, but is Not Doing the
right behaviour (violation of the rules of behaviour -
security is compromised).
Given their knowledge, skills and sometimes author-
ity over others, it seems reasonable to expect that
employees will comply with the requirements/rules.
However, this is sometimes not the case. An exam-
ple of this mode is a person who has been trained
but then does not use his new knowledge or skills
as management expects (Workman et al., 2008) or a
top manager or IT staff member who takes advan-
tage of his position to compromise the rules (Dhillon,
2001). This mode suggests that while knowledge and
skills are a key contributor to users behavioural out-
put they are not the only ones. Theories of cognitive
psychology explain why people may irrationally be-
have. One explanation is that a person’s set of beliefs,
or culture, may influence their actions. This suggests
that if a person has a tendency to perform an autho-
rised act and this tendency needs to be influenced, one
has to focus on changing their primary belief system
(Dhillon, 2001). In this regard, Dhillon suggests that
exposing employees to information about the conse-
quences of their action may produce a change in their
behaviour.
Mode(4): Knowing- Doing: In this mode, which
takes the lower right corner of the model, the sub-
ject Knows the rules of behaviour and has the knowl-
edge/skills and they are Doing the right behaviour
(following the rules - security is not compromised).
This mode is based on the assumption that employ-
ees are rational actors who will comply with require-
ments because they have the necessary knowledge and
skills. This mode is based on the view that people fol-
low rules as a function of cost-benefit analyses (Stout
et al., 2001). As in the case of mode 2, mode 4 is also
linked to the self-regulatory model.
While mode 4 appears to be the “perfect mode” for
management to target, there are at least two reasons
why it is risky to rely on this mode alone. The first
reason is that the information system security disci-
pline is rapidly evolving as is the threat environment,
and the required level of knowledge and skills. Yet,
Mode 4 assumes that actors are able to keep their
knowledge and skills current. This has always been a
major challenging and costly task. The second reason
is that it is not enough to secure the system by rely-
ing on those subjects who have the knowledge/skills
and are Doing the right behaviours. Mode 4 requires
the same level of planning, monitoring and managing
as the previous modes. Furthermore an employee’s
behaviour may change from one mode to another, de-
pending on their organisational role, the state of tech-
nology development, and the status and availability
of security training.
3 Method
This article presents the findings from three ex-
ploratory case studies conducted in organisations in
Saudi Arabia. Three methods were used to col-
lect qualitative case data: semi-structured interviews,
field notes and document analysis. For the purposes
of this study, efforts were made to select diverse case
organisations to allow for different of business, or-
ganisational size and approaches to information sys-
tems security management. The organisations se-
lected for the study are Case A - a private organi-
sation in the over 5000 employees category, Case B -
represent participants from public organisations and
Case C - a non-profit organisation which employs ap-
proximately 3,600 people, organisations in Saudi Ara-
bia. The research was conducted in three phases over
three years (January 2007-December 2009). This pa-
per presents the preliminary result of this study. The
first phase involved gathering data on the case organi-
sations information security management approaches
and practices to establish a baseline for later research.
The sources of data for the interviews were senior
managers, information security managers, functional
managers, IT specialists, and IT users in each of the
case study organisations.
In total, 13 interviews were conducted in case A, 16
in case B and 11 in case C with a further 7 interviews
being carried out with Saudi PhD students who hold
a related IT position in their work. Each interview
lasted on average one and a half hours. The interview
data was supplemented by a range of documentary ev-
idence. This evidence was acquired from sources such
as field notes, annual reports, organisational charts,
official policy statements, and corporate Web sites.
4 Analysis and Findings
In all three cases, participants were asked to identify
three main causes of security incidents as well as the
obstacles to achieving improved information security
compliance in their organisation. The interview data
from the three cases revealed that behavioural issues
associated with users’ security compliance behaviour
were the most common concern. These issues include
password sharing, using shortcuts, downloading In-
ternet software, surfing potentially harmful content,
ignoring relevant procedures, not sharing information
and knowledge relevant to information security prac-
tices, not reporting security violations, and not en-
forcing security-related rules.
The first main cause of security incident was cited
as users’ errors or non-compliance. One IT manager
pointed out that user error was the main cause of
many of the information security incidents.
“all of the analyses we conducted on the
various aspects of security incidents have
identified careless and violation of policy
rules as the main causes of accidents.”
The second cause identified in all three cases may
arise from first and was identified as attacks from
viruses and malicious software. In Cases A and C,
the third factor identified was hardware failure, while
in Case B the third factor was system administrator
errors or non-compliance. This variation may reflect
that both Cases A and C had issues relating to bud-
get constraints. In other words, these case organi-
sations cannot afford to implement effective security
mechanisms and procedures to protect themselves or
they have other more important budgetary priorities.
Another possible explanation is that both Cases were
lacking information security staff or their current staff
did not have the required level of skills. Whereas in
Case B the issue seems to be more related to IT staff
not following the right procedures and using shortcuts
rather than lacking the required skills.
In terms of the obstacles to achieving improved secu-
rity compliance, the cross-case analysis presented in
Table 2 indicates that the participants in Case B and
C saw the lack of clear direction in security procedures
and roles as the major obstacle. In Case A, the lack
of awareness and training programs was identified as
the first obstacle, while the lack of clear direction in
security procedures and roles came as a second. This
is followed by the lack of motivation programs as the
third obstacle in all three cases.
The variation between the cases appears to indicate
existence and implementation of an organisation-wide
information security policy in Case A. Whereas in
both cases B and C information security procedures
and rules were embedded in other organisational po-
lices. Nevertheless, in Case A, participants identified
“lack of awareness” as the second obstacle which in-
dicates that that communicating the information se-
curity policy to the users is an issue of concern of
Case A. Table 2 shows the main causes of security in-
cidents and obstacles to achieving improved security
compliance in the three cases.
Table 2: The main causes of security incidents and
obstacles to achieving improved security compliance
in the three cases
The main causes of secu-
rity incidents
The obstacles to achiev-
ing improved security
compliance
Case A 1)The users’ errors or
non-compliance.
2)Viruses and malicious
software.
3)The hardware failure.
1)Lack of awareness and
training programs.
2)Lack of clear direc-
tion in security proce-
dures and roles.
3)The lack of motivation
programs.
Case B 1)The users’ errors or
non-compliance.
2)Viruses and malicious
software.
3)The system adminis-
trator’s errors or non-
compliance.
1)Lack of clear direc-
tion in security proce-
dures and roles.
2)Lack of awareness and
training programs.
3)The lack of motivation
programs.
Case C 1)The users’ errors or
non-compliance.
2)Viruses and malicious
software.
3)The hardware failure.
1)Lack of clear direc-
tion in security proce-
dures and roles.
2)Lack of awareness and
training programs.
3)The lack of motivation
programs.
In order to build in-depth inferences from the case
studies, further data analysis was conducted to visu-
alise and identify patterns and relationships between
individuals’ information security related behaviours.
The aim was to determine whether or not the con-
ceptual model (illustrated in figure 1) and four modes
comprehensively describe individuals’ information se-
curity behaviours that occur in the course of conduct-
ing their daily work.
The results presented in Table 3 seem to suggest
the plausibility of the four modes, for Cases A, B,
and C. While there were similarities in terms of all
four modes of information security behaviour being
present in the three cases, variations were found in
the behaviours related to each of the modes. Based
on our findings from three case studies we placed each
case on a grid chart (see Figure 2), as red, green and
blue circles representing Case A, Case B and Case
C respectively. The case study findings are reported
below through an exploration of the framework’s four
modes as follows.
Not Knowing
Doing
Not Doing
Knowing
Case C
Case A
Case B
Figure 2: Information Security Behaviour Modes at
the three cases
Mode(1):Not Knowing-Not Doing mode:
In Cases B and C, individuals were not aware of their
organisations’ information security policies; hence,
they could not be expected to act to follow them. As
noted earlier, regardless of having the necessary re-
sources and the motivation to do so, if an individual
lacks knowledge of the requirements or rules he/she
may not exhibit appropriate information security be-
haviours. This is a type of of cognitive failure that
also includes issues such as misunderstanding the se-
curity policy or missing an update of the policy. In
Cases B and C there was no evidence to show that
unified and / or clearly articulated information secu-
rity policies had been communicated to users. The
lack of understanding about policy appeared to be
the main contributor to most of the non-compliance
issues reported by Case B and C.
For instance, respondents from both Cases B and C
raised the importance of organisational policies to the
development of information security ( e.g. policy that
seeks to standardize managerial procedure). It also
appeared that the lack of clarity about what kind of
procedures needed to be followed and enforced con-
tributed to the lack of information security compli-
ance in Case Organisation C.
One IT staff member explained:
“ mostly individuals are taken for granted
to do the right thing [following information
security rules and procedures] but, unfortu-
nately, individuals in most cases doing the
wrong things”
Managers from different departments also supported
IT staff views that the absence of clear information
security procedures and directions had contributed
considerably to information security system incidents.
All the interviewees in Case C, indicated that they
were not familiar with the information security pol-
icy, although the IT manager made the following ob-
servation:
“It [the information security related pro-
cedures] has provided us with some guidance
in different cases,initially. Now whether all
departments would have followed and en-
forced them is another question”
Mode(2): Not Knowing-Doing mode:
The data collected from the case the interviews
showed that most of the participants in three Cases
were risk averse which although they do not know
predisposes them to act conservatively. This aver-
sion was mainly attributed to the belief that taking
risks could affect their organisation’s information as-
sets. In Case A, and to a some extent, in Case B, a
combination of self-consciousness as a member of the
organisation and a willingness to abide by the organ-
isation’s rules indicated two aspects of both Case’s
organisational cultures. The first aspect was a sen-
sitivity to losing information, knowing that they will
be questioned about. The other was the hope for a
reward, through the KPIs systems, as well as group
bonus schemes, which were linked to organisational
performance in the case of case A.
In a similar vein, all participants pointed out that
cultural values can influence employees’ information
security related behaviours. For example one partic-
ipant noted:
“certain cultural values could make peo-
ple do the right thing but other values may
not”
One can infer from the last part of this statement that
certain individual cultural values may have a posi-
tive or negative influence on employees’ security be-
haviour. Most of the case data appears to support
this claim, for instance respondents indicated that
there is a cultural influence on individuals’ security-
related behaviour which poses challenges, although
managers may overcome these challenges by extended
exposure to managerial activities such as training
and/or awareness. However, some respondents did
not see all personal cultural values as having a nega-
tive influence, especially in the context of individual
security related behaviour. One manager summarised
his thoughts:
“There are different components of the
personal culture. Some of these values are
good in promoting good behaviour”
He went on to illustrate his point using an example
showing that some cultural values are useful in posi-
tively influencing individual security behaviour:
“ in some cases religion values dictate
where one is going. These religion values
may hold one from visiting prohibited sites
which usually have some viruses or spywares
that could cause security related problems.”
Table 3: Modes of individuals’ behaviour of information security culture in the three Cases
Modes Case A Case B Case C
Mode(1)Not knowing-Not doing Some IT staff were not shar-
ing related information and
knowledge because they were
not aware of the right mech-
anism.
Most of employees were not
aware of the information se-
curity policy. There were no
clear instructions provided
for them by the IT depart-
ment.
Most of the employees were
not aware of the informa-
tion security policy because
there were no clear instruc-
tions provided for them by
the IT department. Indi-
viduals’ non-compliance be-
haviour was seen as a result
of the lack of existence and
clarity of related rules and
consequences of taking infor-
mation security risks.
Mode(2) Not knowing-Doing Voluntary sharing culture of
information and knowledge
related to information secu-
rity between IT staff.
As in public organisations,
employees rely on the man-
agers to solve work is-
sues. Most non-compliance
behaviour was prevented.
Some national culture values
prevented users from visiting
illegal Web contents. Shar-
ing between technical staff
takes an informal approach.
Sharing information and
knowledge between technical
staff takes an informal ap-
proach. Some culture values
dictated users actions.
Mode(3)Knowing-Not doing Although users were aware
of the information security
procedures, some users
intentionally conducted
non-compliance behaviours,
example; using shortcuts,
downloading Internet soft-
ware.
Employees were ignoring re-
lated procedures by down-
loading Internet software.
Some employees may have a
tendency to not report col-
leagues’ violations for the
sake of saving the group’s
image.
Users were using shortcuts,
downloading Internet soft-
ware. Some function man-
agers may have a tendency
to not enforce the rules to
discipline their subordinates
for a sympathetic or protec-
tion concerns.
Mode(4)Knowing-Doing The level of information security culture indicted that majority of members in all cases
fit in this mode.
This data indicates that some cultural values may
impact on an individuals security-related behaviour
and ultimately influence information security culture
in a positive way.
This last point can be further examined by under-
standing aspects of the relationship between man-
agers and employees. As is common for national
cultures that score high on Hofstede’s (1984) Power
Distance dimension such as Saudi Arabia, executives
and managers at upper-levels are sought out for ad-
vice and guidance (Hofstede, 1984). In a high Power
Distance culture, employees usually rely on managers
to solve work issues, because managers often attain
the role of problem-solver. The impact of the Power
Distance dimension is reflected in some of the infor-
mation security managers’ comments:
“ When they [employees] face problem
they come to me and I do my best..”
“We direct them [employees].”
In these cultures IT staff report issues to the IT Man-
ager, who provides guidance and directives, which are
then actioned by the IT department staff. As one IT
staff member commented:
“We follow the organisation’s procedures
by getting the decision from high manage-
ment.”
These comments suggest that people may lack the
experience to resolve problems since managers deal
with issues in the absence of explicit procedures. Un-
der these conditions, undesirable employee informa-
tion security behaviour and actions may be minimised
as most activities have to be approved by immediate
managers or work supervisors.
Although negatively affected by the lack of sharing
and motivation mechanisms, some employees have
adopted informal means for sharing information and
knowledge related to information security systems.
Members of Case A, for example, meet after work
and the conversation usually turns to something that
happened during their work hours. Whenever the
group are together they discuss issues and problems
encounter in their daily work. As one participant ex-
plained:
”Yes, we discuss some [ISM]issues in our
lunch brakes or at the informal meetings.
It is a good opportunity to ask for opinions
or share some experience with colleagues....
Not only with IT people but with others as
well, such as HR people..”
Mode(3):Knowing-Not Doing mode:
The data revealed that there was careless risk tak-
ing by individuals who used shortcuts, downloaded
internet software, and surfed harmful internet con-
tent. These practices, as noted, varied between the
three cases. In Cases B and C these behaviours can
be mostly attributed, to the lack of and poor clar-
ity about the rules and consequences of taking in-
formation security risks. Whereas in Case A, the
data indicated intentional incidents relating to non-
compliant behaviour. For example, Case A’s Intranet
sites are updated regularly with security information,
and employees are encouraged to access these sites
on a regular basis. However, there was a percep-
tion that many of the organisation’s members did
not take these routine information security awareness
programs seriously. One participant commented on
security warning e-mails:
“the IT department sends a lot of warn-
ing e-mails related to security issues...almost
every day...but I’m sure not every one takes
them seriously.”
Another participant admitted that:
“Because some people do not have
enough time they delete warning e-mails
without even bothering to look at them...”
Mode(4):Knowing-Doing mode:
The level of information security culture in all three
cases indicted that majority of information security
related behaviours fit into this mode. Data showed
that members in all three cases believed that the
organisation’s dependence on information systems is
“very high and security is an integral part of this
equation”. Most participants indicated that there was
a certain level of comfort with the progress that their
IT department was making in information security re-
lated areas. For example, in all cases, the data showed
that top management commitment to information se-
curity was exemplified by allocating the necessary re-
sources and adopting technical solutions to enhance
information security programs.
The influence of national culture traits (for example,
Hofstede’s Power Distance dimension) may be seen in
the practices associated with this mode. Saudi Ara-
bia is a high Power Distance society, and data from
all three cases indicated that individuals intended to
follow the expectations of management and they are
more likely to approve actions that they perceive to
be supported by functional managers and work super-
visors. These traits appear to be having a substantial
influence on individuals’ information security related
behaviour in all three case studies.
Furthermore, the data indicated that a combination
of self-consciousness as a member of the organisation
and a willingness to abide by the organisation’s rules
was present in the organisational culture of the three
cases. The sensitivity of losing information, knowing
that they will be questioned about and the hope for
rewards for reporting security incidents were also key
factors in individuals’ compliance with information
security requirements.
However, as previously discussed, we should expect
organisations’ actors to keep their knowledge and
skills current and it is not enough to secure the sys-
tem by addressing the concern of those who have the
knowledge/skills to do the right things alone. Organ-
isations are going through a rapid and costly change
as they seek to adjust and perform in the changing
environment (e.g. new regulations, new technology
and new threats). Therefore, mode 4 requires the
same level of planning, monitoring and managing as
the previous modes. An employee’s behaviour may
alter from one mode to another, depending on the
organisational role the subject happens to be in, the
state of technology deployment, and the relevance and
availability of the suitable training.
5 Discussion and Next Steps
The findings supported the proposed model of the
four modes of information security behaviour. A
number of factors appeared to be interrelated. These
inter-related factors included organisational cultural
values manifest in practices and activities related to
information security management, and factors related
to the national culture, particularly the influence of
power-distance on individual. The most important
factors identified in this study were top management
commitment, the level of training and IT skills, se-
curity awareness programs, organisational IT struc-
tures, the appointment of information security man-
agers, type of motivation system utilised, existence of
information security policy, and adoption of informa-
tion security standards. Other factors were related
to the influence of national culture on values in de-
cision making, compliance, risk taking, sharing cul-
ture, collaboration, enforcement, reporting, and com-
munication. Hence, these findings are consistent with
the view that an individual actor’s decision to comply
with security requirements is not only a function of
the their knowledge and skills or the perceived cost-
benefit of the behaviour as described in economic the-
ories, but also, a function of the factors arising from
the users’ psychology and the social setting in which
the actor is situated. Therefore it is crucial to under-
stand how aspects of organisational and national cul-
ture inform employees’ practices in order to achieve a
high level of information security culture.
The complexity inherent in contemporary organisa-
tions suggests that organisations will have individuals
who do not share a view of information security, and
yet are expected to participate in the information se-
curity culture of that organisation. These disparate
views may be attributed to the different assumptions,
attitudes and values towards the information system
implementation and use processes held by each of em-
ployee. Variation may also be related to, rapid tech-
nological advances bringing about an increase in the
range of tools used for conducting unauthorised be-
haviours. Another noteworthy point, is that most em-
ployees assume the security of their organisation is not
their responsibility and that only IT staff are respon-
sible. Therefore, it is important to understand, what
underlying principle values, beliefs and assumptions
drive users behaviour. This is further complicated by
the rate of change in the information systems environ-
ment with respect to security threats, which makes
it unwise to assume that individual knowledge/skills
will be current and that individual behaviour will re-
main as expected.
The challenge is now to determine the parts of an
organisation’s environment that facilitate and enable
sustainable approaches to information security adher-
ence. This is a complex issue with no easy answers.
One aspect emphasised in the literature is the notion
of creating a security culture, which is emerging as
a goal for governments and corporations in their at-
tempts to safeguard their information assets. We con-
tend that a culture that encourages ethical conduct
and commitment to compliance with information se-
curity requirements is a desirable organisational at-
tribute. Many researchers have addressed the impor-
tance and the need for an information security culture
in organisations (Chia et al., 2002; Ruighaver et al.,
2007; Schlienger and Teufel, 2002, 2003; Zakaria and
Gani, 2003; Zakaria, 2004). They all suggest that or-
ganisations must take affirmative steps to create an
environment where security is ”everyone’s responsi-
bility” and doing the right thing is the norm.
These observations provide a basis for us to propose
“the information security culture mode”. In this mode
organisations would work towards developing an in-
formation security culture where all employees adhere
to its information security policy and rules even when
no one is around and when their behaviour is not
being monitored. Practices in mode 5 would also in-
clude cooperative information security, such as taking
action against acts that would jeopardise the informa-
tion security system for example, reporting unautho-
rised acts, and sharing security-related information
and knowledge through the appropriate formal and
informal channels.
In order to achieve the mode of information security
culture, two things will need to occur. Firstly, the en-
vironmental factors that influence behaviour and en-
courage or inhibit individual employees and managers
from doing the right thing, even when they know what
the policy says, should be identified. Secondly, an ef-
fective management strategy that handles both inter-
nal and external factors critical to information secu-
rity should be implemented.
This paper provides some insights but, clearly, ad-
ditional investigations are required. Hence, we pro-
pose that a multi-methodological approach will be re-
quired to capture the richness of the information se-
curity management systems (ISMS) implementation
processes in developing countries and the influence of
both organisational and national culture values on in-
formation security culture development. More specif-
ically, this second phase will explore information se-
curity management related activities within organi-
sations in the Saudi Arabia context and how individ-
ual manager and employee personal values may af-
fect the transition towards an information security
culture. The study will use an integrated frame-
work that incorporating information security culture
into existing cultural models. Further, the study will
adopt change management as an effective manage-
ment strategy that manages both internal and exter-
nal changes.
6 Conclusion
Based on evidence from three exploratory case stud-
ies, we populated a framework of information secu-
rity practices that could contribute to information se-
curity management by identifying behaviours related
to four modes of information security practice. The
aim was to classify individual information security be-
haviours in organisations to ensure the development
of high quality information security cultures. The in-
formation security modes described in this paper pro-
vide a sound basis that can be used to evaluate in-
dividual organisational members’ behaviour and the
adequateness of existing security measures.
Although this approach does not deliver completely
new measures, it leads to a more consistent set of se-
curity parameters which aim to protect against indi-
viduals non-compliant behaviour. The main strength
of our approach is that it takes into account the com-
plexity of human behaviour and their corresponding
actions.
We conclude this paper with three remarks. First,
although individual knowledge and skills are impor-
tant, they alone are not enough to assure a positive
contribution towards information security culture re-
liant on employee behaviours. Second, a person’s set
of beliefs, or personal culture, plays a major role in
influencing their personal attitude towards their se-
curity behaviour. Hence, understanding their under-
ling beliefs is crucial in the process of behavioural
change. Third, the influence of technology, social en-
vironment, regulation and self-interest all contribute
to employees security-related behaviours. As a re-
sult members of an organisation will could exhibit
behaviours from different modes at different points in
time. This continuous movement makes it hard to
secure an organisation’s information system by ad-
dressing a single mode in isolation. Hence, future re-
search efforts should concentrate on investigations of
these factors. The research findings and the model
described in this paper may serve as resources for
further investigating the human, (organisational and
individual) aspects of effective information security
systems.
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